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Ensuring that rural and remote areas in Canada have access to reasonably 
affordable telecommunications has been a long-standing governmental ob-
jective that can be traced back to policies regarding universal access policies 
for telephony. The early 2000s saw a burst of federal and provincial programs 
aimed at extending affordable Internet service to such areas. In January 2001, 
Brian Tobin, the federal minister of Industry at the time, established the Na-
tional Broadband Task Force (NBTF), the principal mission of which was “to 
map out a strategy for achieving the Government of Canada’s goal of ensur-
ing that broadband services are available to businesses and residents in every 
Canadian community by 2004” (National Broadband Task Force 2001, 1).
The NBTF’s report, The New National Dream: Networking the Nation 
for Broadband Access, opened with lofty promises of the sweeping social 
transformations that would follow in the wake of broadband. The following 
passage, from the report’s executive summary, is typical of the rhetoric em-
ployed throughout:
The Task Force is convinced that, over the next 10 or 20 years, the development 
of broadband networks, services and applications will have a profound effect 
on all aspects of Canadian life. Broadband will transform the way we learn, 
the way we work, the way we use our leisure, the way we govern ourselves, 
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the way we communicate, the way we express ourselves and the way we care 
for each other.
It is no exaggeration to say that over time, the impact of broadband com-
munications on Canadian life will be at least as great as the impact of railways, 
highways, airlines, traditional telecommunications and broadcasting. (Na-
tional Broadband Task Force 2001, 3)
Although this upbeat rhetoric was widely supported at the time, there were 
specific challenges from some quarters with respect to who would underwrite 
the costs of this ambitious vision.1 Questions also arose concerning represen-
tation on the task force. As in the case of the earlier Information Highway 
Advisory Council, there had been limited opportunity for public input into 
the work of the task force, and NBTF membership was heavily weighted to-
ward executives from telecommunications companies. Despite the report’s 
recommendation that priority be given to First Nations, Inuit, and rural and 
remote communities, groups representing specific communities, including 
Aboriginal groups, wondered how far the report’s recommendations would, 
in practice, address their interests and concerns. (See, for example, Assembly 
of First Nations 2001b.) There were worries that other considerations—such 
as the goal of universal access, the need to address the sustainability of pro-
posed programs, humanistic objectives (for example, the need for people to 
be connected to a community in order to feel a sense of belonging), and con-
cerns about civic participation (that is, the need to ensure that citizens in an 
online world will be able to fully exercise their civic rights)—had been sub-
ordinated to the government’s overarching agenda, which was fundamentally 
an economic one. These concerns were articulated through briefs and pres-
entations to government policy groups such as the NBTF, in newsletters and 
on websites, and in academic research. But these expressions of concern were 
largely overlooked in national media outlets, and they had little impact on 
the NBTF report itself.
In 2002, a pilot program, Broadband for Rural and Northern Develop-
ment (BRAND), was set up, albeit on a more modest scale than that proposed 
by Tobin and the NBTF. The goal of BRAND was to assist rural, Northern, and 
First Nations communities in improving access to broadband telecommuni-
cations in support of educational, health, and economic opportunities.2 A call 
for applications to the program was then issued.
Among the successful applicants was the Northern Broadband Network 
(NBN), a non-profit Saskatchewan corporation consisting of three partners: 
the Meadow Lake Tribal Council, the Prince Albert Grand Council, and New 
North, an umbrella organization of communities in northern Saskatchewan. 
Each had submitted unsuccessful applications to the first round of the BRAND 
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competition but had been encouraged to resubmit as a combined group. The 
Keewatin Career Development Corporation—a community-based organiza-
tion (CBO) located in La Ronge—provided technical advice regarding both 
rounds of applications, as well as management services later on, while the NBN 
project was being implemented.3 The NBN chose SaskTel, the crown corporation 
responsible for telecommunications in the province, to do the actual work of 
installing cables and equipment. The plan called for the NBN to be dissolved 
when the project was complete, following which SaskTel would operate the 
new network as part of its provincial network, CommunityNet.
This chapter describes how the Keewatin Career Development Corpora-
tion (KCDC) came to be so involved in telecommunications. I examine how far 
the KCDC was able to ensure that programs such as BRAND met the needs of 
its community and to what extent it was forced to abide by rules established 
by more powerful actors that worked to the detriment of the community. Are 
there lessons to be learned from the KCDC’s experiences, both in their own 
right and in comparison with the experience of other organizations, such as 
K-Net, the Western Valley Development Agency (WVDA), and SmartLabrador 
(see chapters 14 and 15), that likewise participated in Industry Canada pro-
grams? The stakes for the KCDC were high. Surviving on short-term fees from 
government programs, it struggled to deliver skills training and network sup-
port for specific geographic areas and local communities. At the same time, 
its circumstances prevented it from becoming as fully embedded in its local 
community as, for example, K-Net was (and still is). Unlike K-Net, the KCDC 
is not formally affiliated with a First Nations tribal council (although it serves 
a primarily Aboriginal population), nor is it involved in the delivery of health 
care services, again in contrast to K-Net, which receives significant funding 
from Health Canada. Without successful project applications and/or the de-
velopment of another source of sustaining revenue, the KCDC would not be able 
to support itself. In such precarious circumstances, the KCDC might ultimately 
have been reduced to a shadow organization, as in the case of SmartLabrador. 
Or, as was the case with WVDA, it might simply have ceased to exist. Either 
outcome would have been a setback for its community.
t H e  k e e wat i n  C a r e e r  d e V e l o P m e n t  C o r P o r at i o n
The KCDC was founded in 1996, with the goal of delivering networked and 
multimedia career services to career counsellors and teachers in northern 
Saskatchewan. The organization is a partnership of fourteen career and edu-
cational service-providing agencies, variously associated with schools (K–12 
and post-secondary), Métis training organizations, First Nations tribal coun-
cils, and the provincial government. Its broad mission was, and remains, to 
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use information and communication technologies (ICTs) for the social and 
economic benefit of the residents of northern Saskatchewan, including First 
Nations, Métis, rural, and remote communities. During the period covered in 
this study, the KCDC’s website slogan was “Bringing technology to the north.” 
A non-profit organization, still based in La Ronge, the KCDC funds its oper-
ations through grants and service fees. Each member agency appoints one 
individual to the board of directors, which provides corporate direction. The 
KCDC also has ex officio board members, representing government depart-
ments such as Industry Canada, with whom it interacts in connection with 
various public programs in which it is involved. Its operations are overseen 
by a general manager and carried out by paid staff.
As one of six First Nations SchoolNet regional management organizations 
(RMOs) in Canada, the KCDC also develops and maintains Internet and video 
conferencing services for eighty-three First Nations schools in Saskatchewan 
and, until 2009, did the same for seventy-three First Nations schools in Al-
berta. Northern Saskatchewan is, however, the KCDC’s primary service area. 
Although Saskatchewan’s Northern Administration District (see figure 16.1) 
encompasses approximately half of the province’s land area, it has only about 
37,000 residents. About 80 percent of those residents are Aboriginal (Cree, 
Dene, and Métis), and two-thirds are under the age of 35.4 The region’s chief 
economic driver is mining.
The KCDC’s history can be divided into four phases. During its initial 
period of growth, from 1996 to 2001, the KCDC participated in a number of 
federal and provincial programs. It proposed and implemented a project for 
the development and support of networked career services in northern Sas-
katchewan. In a hotly competitive contest, it also bid successfully to become 
the Saskatchewan demonstration site for Industry Canada’s Smart Commun-
ities initiative. The KCDC was justifiably proud of being a small Northern 
group that won a very large and prestigious competition. Its Smart Com-
munities project, called Headwaters, ran from 2000 to 2004 and had several 
components, including an online technology training program delivered to 
over five hundred teachers. Headwaterstech, a for-profit vendor of hardware 
and software products for individuals, businesses, and First Nations schools 
in northern Saskatchewan, was established in a storefront in La Ronge’s busi-
ness district. In addition, a youth IT training program was set up.
At the peak of its activities, from 2002 to 2006, the KCDC successfully 
competed to become the First Nations SchoolNet RMO for Saskatchewan and 
Alberta, while also implementing its Headwaters project and participating in 
the BRAND, Saskatchewan CommunityNet, and Alberta SuperNet projects.5 
The youth IT training program grew significantly both in size and formal-
ity through its partnership with the Cisco Networking Academy. Drawing 
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Figure 16.1  Northern Administration District, Saskatchewan (2010).  
Courtesy of Saskatchewan Ministry of First Nations and Métis Relations.
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on funds from several federal government sources, this program gave Ab-
original youth practical and accredited experience and training in computer 
repair and networking. In addition, in 2005 the KCDC submitted a proposal 
to the Workplace Skills Initiative of Human Resources and Skills Develop-
ment Canada (HRSDC), which would build upon the KCDC’s skills training 
and video teleconferencing expertise to provide training support for various 
enterprises (both public and private sector) in northern Saskatchewan and 
northern Alberta (see Keewatin Career Development Corporation 2005). 
During this period, the KCDC had approximately twenty paid employees and 
about twenty youth IT trainees each year.
The third period—the year 2006—was one of struggle. During this time, the 
Headwaters and BRAND projects came to an end, as planned. As First Nations 
SchoolNet RMO, the KCDC was partnering with Saskatchewan CommunityNet, 
but there was concern that SaskTel would lose interest in CommunityNet once 
the subsidies from the provincial government had been used up. Moreover, 
the First Nations SchoolNet RMOs went through a period of great uncertainty 
that was only somewhat resolved by the transfer of the SchoolNet program 
from Industry Canada to Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC). In 
addition, the KCDC’s application to the Workplace Skills Initiative was un-
successful. Half of the KCDC’s staff members were laid off.
Most recently, the KCDC has managed to recover to a considerable ex-
tent, although there is a constant struggle for revenue. After the First Nations 
SchoolNet program moved to INAC, the RMOs were guaranteed funding for 
only two more years. Funding was extended in 2009 for an additional three 
years, albeit at a significantly reduced level (Indian and Northern Affairs Can-
ada 2009). Other activities continued, however, and even grew. An innovative 
online video career counselling program, Breaking Barriers, was a success. 
The program evolved, in part, out of the unsuccessful Workplace Skills Initia-
tive proposal, but in the case of Breaking Barriers the KCDC instead turned to 
the private sector for funding and was able to attract significant sponsorship 
from Cameco, a major mining company. The KCDC’s expertise in multicast 
video conferencing has gained the organization considerable recognition, and 
the KCDC has also established a lucrative working relationship with SaskTel. 
The KCDC is now a very successful SaskTel Authorized High-Speed Internet 
Dealer, repeatedly winning SaskTel’s Rural Dealer of the Year award. The in-
come from this commercial enterprise has become a very important part of 
the KCDC’s budget, as public funding from community development initia-
tives has declined.
The theme of training and skills development runs through all of the KC-
DC’s activities over the years, reflecting its origins and mission. In particular, 
the creation of a local workforce skilled in ICTs was critical not only to the 
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success of the initial NBN project but also to the KCDC’s evolution from a CBO 
into an organization tied more closely to the private sector.
Canada as a knowledge -Based eConomy and soCiety
In the course of its involvement in federal programs, the KCDC inevitably had 
to interact with the government’s own agenda regarding “connectivity” and 
telecommunications. In promoting this agenda, the government has relied 
heavily on the concept of a knowledge-based economy and society (KBES), a 
concept frequently invoked in a wide variety of publications and presentations. 
Rooney et al. (2003) define a “knowledge economy” as one that creates value 
primarily through intellectual activity. A “knowledge-based economy” is, 
accordingly, an economy in which knowledge is the most important product-
ive factor (see, for example, Jessop 2005). The concept of a “knowledge-based 
society” encompasses a broader range of socio-cultural activities, extending 
beyond economic, commercial, or industrial interests. In any KBES, technol-
ogy—especially ICTs—necessarily plays a central role, as the means by which 
knowledge is created and disseminated.
In the discourse surrounding Canada as a KBES, the digital divide—de-
fined most simply as the divide between those individuals who have Internet 
access and those who don’t—is presented as a problem that must be corrected 
so that all individual Canadians can participate fully in the economic and 
social affairs of the country.6 The reasons that make it important for individ-
uals to be able to participate are, however, rooted firmly in the government’s 
desire to ensure that Canada will be able to compete effectively in the global 
KBES—an ability on which Canada’s future economic prosperity is said to de-
pend. Little weight is given to other possible objectives, such as supporting and 
expanding citizens’ opportunities to participate meaningfully in the demo-
cratic governance of their country or fostering individual growth in terms of 
human capabilities and interests.
The actual changes implemented under the rubric of Canada as a KBES, 
notably increased privatization and cutbacks in funding for a broad array of 
social programs, have had far-reaching impacts in all areas of activity that 
are characterized by a high degree of government involvement, such as edu-
cation (Moll 1997; Taylor 1997), (un)employment programs and job training 
(McBride 2000; Russell 2000), and welfare (Ilcan and Basok, 2004), as well as 
on basic telecommunication services. Many of these changes have in turn af-
fected other areas, including the policy options that the federal government has 
pursued in an effort to address the digital divide (Rideout and Reddick 2005).
CBOs have been expected to fill the gap left when the government with-
draws from the direct provision of community services, but typically they 
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lack the resources necessary to do a good job. Rideout and her colleagues, 
using data gathered in a large-scale survey of Canadian CBOs, present a gen-
eral picture of overworked, underpaid—if paid at all—and burnt-out staff 
members struggling to deliver the services that various government agencies 
now rely on them to provide (Gibson, O’Donnell, and Rideout 2007; Rideout 
2007; Rideout et al. 2006; see also chapter 19 in this volume). Staff members 
are far too busy applying for project money and keeping up with the admin-
istrative and reporting requirements of the various programs for which they 
are responsible to have time to function as community advocates.
C o m P e t i n g  d i s C o u r s e s
In what follows, I will seek to describe how specific local actors—the Prov-
ince of Saskatchewan, First Nations groups, and the KCDC—sought at once 
to engage with and to resist the dominant federal discourse, with its vision 
of Canada as a KBES, by developing their own modes of discourse. In so do-
ing, I will draw in part on the methods of critical discourse analysis (see, 
especially, Fairclough 1995; Hardy and Phillips 2004). This approach enables 
a researcher to identify key texts that suggest competing discourses and to 
identify discourses that may have been forced into position of subordination 
by the dominant discourse, as well as to identify strategies that those who 
participate in alternative discourses employ in an effort to modify the dom-
inant discourse so as to better represent their own interests.
The evidence employed in this analysis has been culled from a large corpus 
of texts, including publicly available official documents (speeches, presenta-
tions, reports, press releases, and the like), internal working documents, and 
other texts such as newspaper articles. The written corpus has been enriched 
by visits to the KCDC’s headquarters in La Ronge and interviews with indi-
viduals from Industry Canada, the Province of Saskatchewan, SaskTel, and 
the KCDC. I will begin by examining the texts produced by each of the four 
primary actors separately, in order to identify their respective discursive pos-
itions. These discursive positions will then be analyzed in the context of the 
NBN application to the BRAND program.
The Federal Discourse: A Connected Canada
At least with respect to BRAND, it is the vision of the KBES manifested in texts 
produced by Industry Canada that constitutes the dominant discourse. For 
the purposes of this analysis, four PowerPoint slides taken from presenta-
tions delivered by senior Industry Canada personnel (Lynch 1999; Hull 2000; 
Binder 2003, 2005) can serve to illustrate the chief features of this discourse. 
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Figure 16.2a  The federal discourse of the KBES. A graph taken from a presentation 
by Kevin Lynch, 1999.
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Figure 16.2b  The federal discourse of the KBES. A graph taken from a presentation 
by Douglas Hall, 2000. 
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Figure 16.2c  The federal discourse of the KBES. A graph taken from a presentation 
by Michael Binder, 2003.
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Figure 16.2d  The federal discourse of the KBES. A graph taken from a presentation 
by Michael Binder, 2005.
Access to the Network Economy
Skilled workers, entrepreneurs and 
informed citizens
Increased employment, higher incomes 
and economic growth
Productivity growth and improved 
standard of living
Inclusive 
Society
Innovative 
Economy
New immigrants
Francophone
Rural and remote
SNEs
Youth at risk
Seniors
Aboriginal
Persons with disabilities
Connecting Canadians.indd   315 12-07-12   10:55 PM
316 Winter
For several reasons, these slides can be viewed as offering a definitive sum-
mary of the government’s agenda. Each of the presenters held a senior position 
in Industry Canada. The first presentation was made by Kevin Lynch, at the 
time the deputy minister of Industry Canada. Doug Hull was the director gen-
eral of the Information Highway Applications Branch, and Michael Binder 
was the assistant deputy minister of the Spectrum, Information Technology, 
and Telecommunications Sector. All three thus had significant authority in 
the areas of management and telecommunications policy development. In 
addition, all four presentations took place before large and politically im-
portant audiences. Lynch’s 1999 presentation was directed to members of the 
SchoolNet Advisory Board, and Hull’s presentation in 2000 formed part of 
a “North American Day” conference on e-government, which included rep-
resentatives from the United States and Mexico. The talk that Binder gave at 
the Information Highway Conference in 2003 was delivered, with only minor 
variations, more than twenty times in 2003 and 2004 to a wide variety of 
industry, governmental, and public audiences worldwide. His second pres-
entation, in 2005, took place at the Wireless Communications Association’s 
Global Harmonization and Regulatory Summit, an international conference 
held in Washington DC. All four presentations thus constituted explicit public 
statements regarding Canada’s perspective on telecommunications.7
The federal government’s economic agenda is most clearly visible in the 
slides used by Lynch and Binder (figures 16.2a and b). There is an assumed 
causality in Lynch’s presentation, which begins with “connectedness,” de-
scribed as a “core element” of the twenty-first century KBES. Connectedness 
leads, on the one hand, to “better informed, connected citizens” and thus to 
a “stronger society” and, on the other, to “increased productivity” and thus to 
a “stronger economy.” The same basic linkage is visible in Binder’s 2003 slide, 
albeit with certain variations in wording: “knowledge networks” now produce 
“skilled and empowered citizens” and ultimately an “inclusive society,” while 
“increased competitiveness” leads to an “innovative economy.” Binder’s 2005 
slide (figure 16.2c) makes it clear that various marginalized groups (including 
Aboriginals) are included among “skilled workers, entrepreneurs, and in-
formed citizens”—who, as participants in the “network economy,” will enjoy 
“higher incomes” and an “improved standard of living.” In these slides, one 
can trace the evolution of the Innovation Agenda, which was Industry Can-
ada’s science and technology policy in the early 2000s. Only in Hull’s 2000 
presentation to the e-government conference (figure 16.2d) do we find refer-
ences to factors such as personal development (“life-long learning”) and the 
dissemination of culture (“high-quality Canadian content”).
I asked several of the people I interviewed to comment on these slides. A 
senior manager in Industry Canada’s telecommunications division suggested 
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that Lynch’s presentation “was really a messaging text: ‘There’s something 
new here. We should all get behind it. We should all support it because it’s 
an engine of change.’” In his interpretation, although the message that con-
nectivity is necessary to a stronger economy remained consistent throughout 
the slides, the later slides began to highlight specific applications as the initial 
message was absorbed and new priorities emerged.
He also acknowledged that the government’s new agenda had initially met 
with some resistance. Regarding Lynch’s 1999 presentation to the SchoolNet 
Advisory Board, he commented:
When [we] started promoting SchoolNet, guess who were the ones to oppose 
us? Schools. School boards, teachers . . . We used to come to the SchoolNet Ad-
visory Board, and [one teacher] used to say, “You want to invest in education? 
Hire more teachers.” And you know, we snuck up on schools. We started in 
libraries because librarians were the most advanced knowledge-based man-
agers in the school system.
He expanded on the theme of resistance to Industry Canada’s vision of a con-
nected Canada with regard to the later slides:
We are now into pitching productivity. And so we’re trying to get productivity 
as our new password . . . only we’re running into huge difficulties. Ministers 
are scared of the word because in many, many fora, productivity is viewed 
as less pay for more work. . . . And unions don’t like the P word, even though 
economists love this. Politically it’s a very, very tough sell.
As his use of the word “pitching” suggests, these slides serve a promotional 
purpose. As so often in PowerPoint slides, arrows substitute for a detailed an-
alysis of cause-and-effect relationships.
The Saskatchewan Discourse: Equitable and Affordable Telecommunications
The Saskatchewan government has had a long-standing policy objective of 
providing affordable basic telecommunications services to all the province’s 
residents (Pike 1998). For many decades, SaskTel worked to achieve this ob-
jective by the commonly used strategy of cross-subsidizing the rural and 
remote telephone system by increasing its rates in urban areas. Changes in 
the regulation of the telephone system in the 1990s ended that ability to cross- 
subsidize (Wilson 2000). In addition, as the result of a Supreme Court of Can-
ada decision in 1989, SaskTel was brought under the control of the Canadian 
Radio-television Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) as of the year 2000, 
at which point SaskTel had to comply with the CRTC’s rulings and tariffs.
One product of the province’s objective of equitable and affordable tele-
communications for all is CommunityNet—an initiative to deploy broadband 
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throughout Saskatchewan. Planned in 2000 and implemented starting in 2001, 
CommunityNet was the earliest of numerous programs with similar object-
ives that would come to exist in almost every Canadian province or territory 
(Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission 2003). Com-
munityNet works on the model of aggregating the telecommunication needs 
and uses of public sector units, such as schools, health facilities, libraries, and 
government offices, including those located in rural and remote communities. 
Gathering these individual facilities under the umbrella of a single anchor 
tenant—the Province of Saskatechewan—allowed SaskTel to submit a single 
bill to the Saskatchewan Information Technology Office, which resulted in 
considerable administrative savings. During CommunityNet’s initial phase 
(from 2001 to 2003), the savings produced by this aggregation, combined with 
a subsidy from the provincial government and Western Economic Diversifi-
cation Canada, enabled SaskTel to improve its rural and remote service by 
installing backbone lines, switches, and other core networking equipment 
in smaller communities. Although at the outset CommunityNet was avail-
able only to the public sector units affiliated with the anchor tenant, SaskTel 
was able to use its upgraded core facilities to market its Internet services to 
individuals, privately owned businesses, and other organizations located in 
smaller communities at prices roughly comparable to those available in lar-
ger cities (Himmelsbach 2000; Murray 2002).
Implicit in the anchor tenant approach is a significant challenge of scale. 
Government offices and major health facilities tend to be concentrated in 
larger cities and towns, but schools and libraries are located in many more, 
and much smaller, locations, scattered across a large territory. The Commun-
ityNet plan to link them all to the Internet was thus very ambitious. As of 
2008, CommunityNet had connected most of the province’s schools, includ-
ing all eighty-five First Nations schools, and the regional colleges, as well as 
health facilities, government offices, and public libraries. High-speed broad-
band of at least 1.5 Mbps was available to 366 communities (some with as few 
as three hundred residents), and the number of communities being connected 
has continued to grow.8
During the period when CommunityNet was first being designed and im-
plemented, the Province of Saskatchewan was actively engaged in trying to 
shape the national telecommunications policy environment in a manner that 
would enable the province to achieve its goals. Saskatchewan was an active par-
ticipant in the CRTC Service to High-Cost Serving Areas hearings that began 
in 1997. The province, together with many other participants in the hearings, 
advocated the establishment of national standards of telephone service and 
the creation of a Universal Service Fund, which would have provided residents 
of rural and remote communities with basic telephone service at affordable 
Connecting Canadians.indd   318 12-07-12   10:55 PM
319 R e ver se  Engl ish
rates. When the CRTC rejected the call for a Universal Service Fund, Sas-
katchewan, together with Manitoba (although that province later withdrew 
as a result of the privatization of Manitoba Tel), appealed the decision to the 
federal cabinet. The federal cabinet supported the CRTC’s objections to the 
idea of a Universal Service Fund and rejected the appeal, but it did acknow-
ledge the importance of the issue of equity by ordering the CRTC to monitor 
telephone companies’ deployment of telecommunication services to under-
served areas by having companies file annual Service Improvement Plans 
(Sanders 2000). Importantly, however, the CRTC’s decision pertained only to 
basic telephone service, not to the additional equipment and services needed 
to support Internet access. In its submissions in 2005 to Industry Canada’s 
Telecommunications Policy Review Panel (Saskatchewan 2005; Hersche 2005) 
and again in 2010, in connection with CRTC consultations regarding basic tele-
communications services (Saskatchewan 2010; Fiske 2010), the province has 
continued to press its objective of providing affordable telecommunications 
services to all residents. It insists that it is the federal government’s respon-
sibility to provide a sustainable national solution to the problem of servicing 
rural and remote areas, in which the potential for market failure makes a pri-
vate sector solution unlikely.
The province’s statements regarding the need for affordable and equitable 
telecommunications, along with its arguments in support of CommunityNet, 
together form a consistent discourse that is distinct from that of the fed-
eral government. This competing discourse promotes an activist role for the 
provincial government and insists that an ongoing subsidy is necessary to 
compensate for persistent market failure in rural and remote areas. The dis-
course adopted by the Province of Saskatchewan has, in turn, had an impact 
on the KCDC in its actions as a CBO facilitating the penetration of broadband 
telecommunications services to northern Saskatchewan.
When questioned about the province’s consistency of purpose regarding 
universal access, a SaskTel executive—someone who had considerable prior 
experience as a civil servant responsible for a variety of telecommunica-
tions activities—commented: “There is consistency in [the] desire to do that 
because rural people want it: it’s not a political statement of just Conserva-
tives versus NDP. This government listened to that. The previous government 
listened to that. That’s why CommunityNet got built, but we started some 
of CommunityNet under Gary Lane.” 9 He went on to list an unbroken se-
quence of cabinet ministers from the Conservative, New Democratic, and 
Saskatchewan parties who had supported CommunityNet and the goal of 
affordable and equitable telecommunications. For him, the only real varia-
tion had to do with how much funding the province was able to afford or 
willing to invest at a given time in order to advance this goal. Some times 
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were better than others, to be sure, but there was never any wavering from 
the overarching objective.
He also took considerable pride in Saskatchewan’s accomplishments in 
this area, especially in view of what he viewed as the disproportionate atten-
tion given to Alberta’s SuperNet project in venues such as the Globe and Mail 
and the National Post. As he noted, the relative lack of attention to Saskatch-
ewan’s achievements “was part of the province’s not having any money. When 
I was going to the feds, we were talking about CommunityNet, and Alberta 
was coming on with SuperNet. Well, they had $2 million just for PR. I had 
nothing. I had me. So they had full videos and whatever of all the things that 
they were going to do, and I had me.”
I also spoke with a Saskatchewan civil servant who had managerial and 
policy responsibility for the province’s telecommunications strategy and oper-
ations. He, too, described how proud the province was of CommunityNet, 
particularly because its success demonstrated to SaskTel that there was a mar-
ket for residential and business broadband services in smaller communities:
I always remember back in 1999 the view even from the telco was sort of, “Well, 
you know, we’ve done a business case, and we’ve identified sixteen commun-
ities where clearly broadband high-speed Internet will be a seller, but the rest, 
probably not.” It’s almost a leap of faith, right, because then suddenly we’re 
at 366 communities and it’s selling like hotcakes and everybody’s on it and 
everybody wants it. So sometimes it’s not a business case, and/or the business 
case is not readily apparent.
Both he and the SaskTel official not only recognized the difference in out-
look between the federal and the provincial governments but also appreciated 
the reasons for it. In response to a question about whether the Province of 
Saskatchewan and the federal government differed in their objectives with 
respect to extending broadband to rural and remote areas, the SaskTel offi-
cial responded: “What we would like to see is exactly the same. We would 
like to see rural people with access. We would like to see that.” But he went 
on to point out that the provincial government had a “different methodology” 
and that Industry Canada had other issues to address—“circumstances in 
Canada that I don’t have to deal with in Saskatchewan.” As he saw it, certain 
features of the BRAND program were not particularly well suited to the situa-
tion in some of Saskatchewan’s smaller communities. The BRAND program 
was designed on a community aggregator model in which each community 
was represented by a community champion. If a community could not find 
a champion, it could not apply to the program. The program’s tight time-
lines for initial applications, as well as its sustainability requirements, also 
placed communities that were very small and/or beset by poverty and social 
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problems at a disadvantage. Moreover, under the BRAND program, only com-
munities that were not served at all by publicly available broadband were 
eligible to receive a subsidy. Underserved communities, which might be ad-
jacent to unserved ones, were not eligible. The Saskatchewan preference was 
clearly to install broadband over as large a contiguous region as possible, to 
include not only communities that were underserved or had no service at all 
but also communities that might otherwise be regarded as too small or too 
“backward” to be ready for broadband. In addition, the BRAND program fa-
voured private sector telecommunications companies (Ritter 2006), whereas 
SaskTel, as a crown corporation, was a public sector company.
For him, the solution was to ensure that federal programs could accom-
modate differences among the provinces. He described how the BRAND 
program had been modified to fit the circumstances in Saskatchewan, in 
an effort to address the interests of the assorted staekholders: “We did work 
this out. We fought very hard. I worked with the PA [Prince Albert] Grand 
Council and the Meadow Lake Council and New North, which was KCDC 
for all intents and purposes. And the feds wanted to divide this BRAND pro-
gram up, so only the guys in Meadow Lake or PAGC would win, or the New 
North. Luckily, we had solidarity.” He also noted that SaskTel has only one 
shareholder, the Province of Saskatchewan. This very direct relationship 
means that the company’s policy objectives are closely connected to those of 
the province. In contrast, private sector competitors have many shareholders 
whose fundamental goal is to maximize their profit, not to subsidize servi-
ces to remote and rural users.
In addition, I spoke with a KCDC manager who had considerable expertise 
in and responsibility for computer applications and telecommunications and 
who was involved with the BRAND applications. He used the word “aggres-
sive” to characterize SaskTel’s interest in the Northern Broadband Network: 
“SaskTel was incredibly aggressive about pursuing it. They wanted it, and in 
fact they were . . . at times almost stepping on our toes in terms of trying to 
take ownership of the project, even though technically it was our project and 
they were our vendors.” I also talked to an Industry Canada policy analyst 
who had extensive experience with the department’s programs in Saskatch-
ewan. Regarding SaskTel and its working relationship with Industry Canada, 
she commented:
It’s a love/hate relationship. You love them because they are the only ones who 
are here and who always come to the table and indicate an interest, and you 
hate them because they’re the only ones here. . . . They are a crown corpora-
tion, and they are very protective of their territory. As a business they do what 
they have to do as a business.
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But she also described SaskTel as “good corporate sponsors”: “They contribute 
to events. They contribute significantly to the Computers with Schools part-
nership with Industry Canada. If it wasn’t for the SaskTel Telephone Pioneers 
in Saskatchewan, we’d be very hard pressed.”
SaskTel’s involvement in the NBN project demonstrates how the province’s 
discourse succeeded in influencing the implementation of a federal program, 
namely, BRAND. The SaskTel executive, the KCDC manager, and the Industry 
Canada policy analyst all provide interesting insights into the interactions 
that went on in the course of the initial applications to BRAND and the de-
velopment of the NBN’s business case. SaskTel’s expertise, its existing network 
infrastructure, and the financial resources the crown corporation could bring 
to bear, not only on the BRAND requirement of a 50 percent matching contri-
bution from the applicants but also a five-year commitment to sustaining the 
network, meant that it could play a dominant role in the implementation of the 
NBN. Employing these advantages, SaskTel was able to ensure that BRAND’s 
support for the NBN also supported the province’s discourse of affordable and 
equitable telecommunications.
The Aboriginal Discourse: Ownership, Control, Access, and Possession
Matthew Coon Come, national chief of the Assembly of First Nations, endorsed 
the recommendations of the National Broadband Task Force immediately upon 
the release of its report. His comments established the priorities of economic 
development, health care, education, and autonomy, themes that would be 
repeated consistently:
The establishment of a network that will link all of our communities to the 
communications network will be a major benefit to all of our communities. It 
will improve the strength and productivity of the First Nations economy, will 
improve the quality of the First Nations health care system and ensure that all 
of our citizens have access to learning opportunities. As we move to assume 
control of our own affairs, this will be a major tool in achieving this goal.
He noted that the Assembly of First Nations, in anticipation of the report, had 
entered into discussions with major telecommunications companies about po-
tential partnerships in order to take advantage of the opportunities to come. 
“We missed the Industrial Revolution; we will not miss the information tech-
nology revolution,” he declared (quoted in Assembly of First Nations 2001a).
The needs of the Aboriginal community in this area were acknowledged 
by the federal government in the 2001 Speech from the Throne (Canada 2001), 
which recognized “the critical goal of making broadband access widely avail-
able to citizens, businesses, public institutions and to all communities in 
Canada by 2004” and made explicit reference to Aboriginal communities. As 
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noted earlier, when the BRAND pilot program was announced in 2002, pri-
ority was to be given to unserved First Nations, Inuit, and remote and rural 
communities. A flurry of activity ensued over the following year, with reports, 
resolutions, and proposals produced by many groups at levels ranging from 
local to national. An analysis of these texts, including the unsuccessful ap-
plications of the Meadow Lake Tribal Council and the Prince Albert Grand 
Council to the first round of the BRAND program and the successful applica-
tion of the Northern Broadband Network, reveals the discursive position of 
Aboriginal communities in relation to telecommunications.10
Two of the three applicants for the first round of BRAND funding were the 
Meadow Lake Tribal Council and the Prince Albert Grand Council. Tribal 
councils represent the interests of the individual bands that make up their 
membership. They were initially responsible for managing the various social 
welfare programs whose administration had devolved to local organizations, 
but their activities have expanded over the years in accordance with specific 
circumstances. In particular, they have become quite prominent as a vehicle 
for economic development.
The Meadow Lake Tribal Council, which originated in 1981, represents 
nine First Nations bands located in the northwestern section of Saskatch-
ewan. It manages several educational and social welfare programs on behalf 
of its members and has also been notably successful in the area of economic 
development, with a strong presence in the forestry sector through its share of 
ownership in several forestry enterprises. More recently, as the forestry sector 
has languished, the council has embarked on commercial partnerships and 
joint ventures in the emerging oil and gas sector in that part of the province. 
The Prince Albert Grand Council, which dates back to 1977, represents twelve 
First Nations bands in central and northern Saskatchewan. Like the Meadow 
Lake council, it has a very active and successful record of economic develop-
ment. Until recently, it was principally involved with businesses such as hotels 
and gas bars in urban areas, although its activities are diversifying. In the area 
of economic development, both the Meadow Lake Tribal Council and the 
Prince Albert Grand Council are well established, knowledgeable, and nota-
bly successful, with extensive experience in partnering with other companies.
The initial BRAND applications from the Meadow Lake Tribal Council 
and the Prince Albert Grand Council originated from their economic de-
velopment offices. During the 1990s, Robert Anderson carried out research on 
Saskatchewan tribal councils and their economic development activities, and 
his ideas provided a helpful tool for analyzing the discourse of the Meadow 
Lake and Prince Albert councils in relation to the NBN. Anderson (1999) argues 
that Aboriginal engagement with the global economy can provoke a variety 
of responses, ranging from various forms of opting out—whether passively, 
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through isolation, or actively, through open resistance or even violence—to 
various modes of engagement, which can again be active or passive. Within 
this analytical framework, the actions of Aboriginal peoples in Canada in the 
area of economic development have been characterized by active engagement, 
but on their own terms (Anderson, Dana, and Dana 2006).
Anderson (1999, 13) describes the Aboriginal approach to economic de-
velopment as:
1. A predominantly collective one centred on the community or “nation”
2. For the purposes of:
• Attaining economic self-sufficiency as a necessary condition for the 
realization of self-government
• Improving the socioeconomic circumstances of Aboriginal people
• Preserving and strengthening traditional culture, values and languages 
(and reflecting the same in development activities)
3. Involving the following processes:
• Creating and operating businesses to exercise control over the economic 
development process
• Creating and operating businesses that can compete profitably over the  
long run in the global economy, to build the economy necessary to support 
self-government and improve socioeconomic conditions
• Forming alliances and joint ventures among themselves and with non-
Aboriginal partners to create businesses that can compete profitably in  
the global economy
• Building capacity for economic development through (i) education,  
training and institution building and (ii) the realization of the treaty  
and Aboriginal rights to land and resources
• Strengthening bonding and bridging social capital.
As Anderson’s analysis might suggest, the terms ownership and control figure 
prominently in the discursive strategy of Aboriginal peoples, as does the fact 
of their collective ownership of the land awarded them by treaty. The phrase 
“ownership, control, access, and possession,” which I chose to describe the 
competing discourse offered by Aboriginal groups, derives from an influential 
article by Brian Schnarch, who elaborates on these four principles in relation 
to research by and with First Nations, with particular reference to the con-
cept of self-determination. According to Schnarch (2004, 80), “ownership, 
control, access, and possession” can be understood as “a political response 
to tenacious colonial approaches to research and information management.” 
Clear parallels exist between Schnarch’s summary of these principles as they 
pertain to information management and Anderson’s analysis of Aboriginal 
economic development (see table 16.1).
Connecting Canadians.indd   324 12-07-12   10:55 PM
325 R e ver se  Engl ish
Table 16.1  Principles articulated in Aboriginal discourse
Schnarch (2004, 81) Anderson (1999, 13)
Ownership “A community or group owns 
information collectively.”
The community has collective 
ownership of economic enterprises.
Control First Nations peoples “control all 
aspects of the research and information 
management processes that impact 
them.”
Control refers not only to ownership 
but also to the strategies of 
partnerships and joint ventures by 
which ownership is exercised.
Access “First Nations peoples must have 
access to information and data about 
themselves and their communities 
regardless of where it is currently held.”
Access to the First Nations lands is 
one of the most powerful levers that 
First Nations can use to achieve their 
economic development goals.
Possession Possession is a “mechanism by which 
ownership can be asserted and 
protected.”
Ownership and joint ventures provide 
access to the operating details of 
various enterprises in a manner that 
promotes trust and confidence.
Ownership of the NBN was initially a high priority of the two tribal coun-
cils. The SaskTel official whom I interviewed had been actively involved in 
the company’s response to the Request for Proposal (RFP) issued by the NBN. 
In answer to a question about whether the Meadow Lake Tribal Council and 
the Prince Albert Grand Council viewed the project slightly differently than 
did Industry Canada and SaskTel, he commented: “Yes. When they started 
. .  . they looked at it as a business opportunity. So they said, when we first 
got started, ‘I want to own it.’” To the same question, the KCDC manager and 
telecommunications expert, who was likewise closely involved with the prep-
aration of the applications to BRAND, responded:
The perspective was there, from the Northern Broadband Network side, that 
there would be some type of ownership of the network at the end of the day, 
and SaskTel didn’t want to do that. . . . There was going to be some discussion 
about business opportunities, etc. etc., which never really came to a whole 
lot. There was no network ownership. . . . No other sort of businesses started 
between SaskTel and the tribal councils to take advantage of that.
A senior KCDC staff member, who was also closely involved with the NBN 
application as it was developed, made a similar comment: “The philosophy 
for the First Nations side was that the money came to them from the federal 
government and that they should be able to leverage some of that into some 
ownership of the network,” although, as he went on to note, “even within the 
tribal council[s] there was the alternate opinion that ownership of the net-
work would include risk.”
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SaskTel was opposed to joint ownership of the NBN. In interacting with 
the tribal councils, their strategy was to call attention to the considerable on-
going costs and risks involved in running a broadband telecommunications 
network. These included the financial risk of extending service to small, re-
mote, and geographically scattered areas, as well as the costs of maintaining 
and upgrading equipment. SaskTel also highlighted the risk of having to cut 
off delinquent customers who might be members of one of the First Nations 
bands represented by the tribal councils who co-owned the network. As the 
senior KCDC staff member’s comment indicates, at least some members of the 
tribal councils recognized these risks.
It is evident from this analysis that the approach taken by the Meadow 
Lake Tribal Council and Prince Albert Grand Council illustrates the pat-
tern of active engagement, but on their own terms, that Anderson sees as 
characteristic of the approach of Canadian Aboriginal groups to economic 
development. Their interest in establishing ownership of the NBN also illus-
trates several of the processes of economic development that Anderson lists, 
among them “forming alliances and joint ventures among themselves and 
with non-Aboriginal partners to create businesses that can compete profitably 
in the global economy” and “creating and operating businesses to exercise 
control over the economic development process.” This was the immediate 
goal of the discourse of ownership, control, access, and possession. Also ap-
parent, however, is the existence of a pragmatic element that recognizes, on 
a case-by-case basis, when that discourse might not be appropriate, as was 
the case with the NBN in its final form—a not-for-profit corporation formed 
solely for the purpose of administering the BRAND proposal.
The KCDC Discourse: Land, Health, and Jobs
Conversations with staff members at the KCDC during site visits and inter-
views made it clear that they see a distinction between the values and interests 
of northern Saskatchewan and those of Aboriginal peoples. While they under-
stand that because the overwhelming majority of residents of the North are 
Aboriginal, any Northern organization must and will reflect Aboriginal 
concerns and interests, they also acknowledge the existence of a distinct dis-
course that focuses on the interests shared by most Northerners, whether 
Aboriginal or not. Reviewing the KCDC’s Headwaters application to Indus-
try Canada’s Smart Communities project and its submission to HRSDC in 
connection with its Workplace Skills Initiative, as well as business plans and 
other documents,11 I was able to identify a discourse of “land, health, and 
jobs”—a phrase that key KCDC staff members agreed was an appropriate de-
scription of their priorities.
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As the texts I examined reveal, the KCDC and its partner organizations 
feel that they are rooted in the land. Their values, interests, and activities are 
framed by the goal of enabling residents of northern Saskatchewan to engage 
in fulfilling lives despite living in geographically remote areas where they must 
cope with social isolation and relatively scant opportunities for employment. 
The documents also reveal a concern with physical and mental well-being, 
with health-related services delivered in the North through such means as 
Canada Health Infoway’s Telehealth. Finally, the texts that focus on education 
and skills training aim at the creation of a skilled workforce whose members 
will be able to find jobs in northern Saskatchewan.
The KCDC telecommunications expert—himself a long-time resident of 
northern Saskatchewan who felt fortunate to have found a challenging job 
in his own community—very explicitly noted the linkage between telecom-
munications infrastructure, education, and good local jobs for Northerners:
Math and science education, for example, in northern Saskatchewan is a real 
concern. The principal economic driver is mining. The skilled mining jobs—as 
opposed to equipment operators, which are semi-skilled—all require sig-
nificant comfort levels with advanced science and math and post-secondary 
training that requires those as prerequisites. So you have both post-secondary 
school training needs and high school training needs in the maths and sci-
ences which are difficult to fulfill [in northern Saskatchewan].
For the KCDC, then, the point is not to educate and train residents of the 
North only to have them move to larger, better developed urban centres in 
order to find work. Rather, the goal is to strengthen the social and economic 
fabric of the North by encouraging skilled individuals to remain in the area.
As the discussion of these three competing discourses demonstrates, 
none of the actors was fundamentally opposed to the dominant discourse 
of the KBES. Each, however, sought to modify that discourse to better suit 
their respective interests. In reaction to Industry Canada’s preference for 
relying on market economies, minimal subsidies, and limited-term projects 
to expand broadband services throughout the country, the Province of Sas-
katchewan sought to ensure that room would be left for universal, sustained, 
and non-market-based programs that would support equitable service for all 
the province’s residents. The Aboriginal discourse of ownership and control 
endeavoured to allow First Nations to engage actively with the KBES but in a 
manner consistent with their particular cultural and economic circumstances 
and objectives. The KCDC’s discourse was concerned with bringing the full 
benefits of the KBES—social, educational, and cultural, as well as economic—
to a specific rural and remote region via broadband telecommunications.
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r e V e r s e  e n g l i s H
In billiards and pool, reverse English refers to the side spin that a player can 
put on the cue ball when striking it. The spin moves the ball into an advanta-
geous position on the table in order to set up subsequent shots. By skillfully 
manoeuvring the cue ball in this manner, an expert player can sink every 
ball on the table.
The metaphor of reverse English offers a useful description of the strategies 
of resistance to the federal discourse of the KBES that the KCDC has employed, 
especially in connection with the BRAND program. Such a strategy is visible 
in the manner in which the KCDC tried to modify the rules governing the 
program and in the ways it built on earlier successes in an effort to win new 
grant competitions, as well as in the tactics it has used to draw jobs to north-
ern Saskatchewan.
Community-based organizations such as the KCDC sometimes seek to 
modify the criteria according to which government policy and programs are 
designed and evaluated. This is one instance of the use of reverse English—at-
tempting to alter the rules of the game so that future programs will be better 
suited to the CBO’s objectives as well as to the constraints under which it oper-
ates. Commenting on the relationship that had evolved between the KCDC and 
the Saskatchewan-based staff of Industry Canada, the KCDC telecommuni-
cations expert noted that the arrangement allowed the KCDC some latitude. 
“Our entire Smart Communities program was based on bending the rules, not 
breaking [them],” he commented, “but where they didn’t make sense, we bent 
them.” He went on to say that Industry Canada staff members “were comfort-
able enough with us doing that, and we were comfortable enough that they 
were going to let us do it by the time we got to BRAND.”
There is also an element of mutual dependence in the government’s use 
of CBOs to deliver programs, which gives the CBOs a certain power. I asked 
the Saskatchewan-based Industry Canada policy analyst whom I interviewed 
what would happen if the requirements governing a particular program were 
so tightly designed and so stringent that no CBO was interested in becoming 
involved in program delivery. In response, she acknowledged that such a cir-
cumstance would create a severe problem for the government. She also noted 
that there has been increasing recognition that national programs must al-
low for tailor-made local solutions. “The Smart Communities project was a 
very innovative way of adapting one particular national project to a particu-
lar region,” she commented. It “built on partnerships that identified various 
communities that are geographic communities of interest,” while it also “set 
strategic outcomes and goals that would in fact address particular identified 
needs.” In short, Industry Canada understood that, to achieve its own object-
ives, it needed to maintain some degree of flexibility.
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The strategy of reverse English is also visible in the grant application 
that the KCDC prepared for submission to HRSDC’s Workplace Skills Initia-
tive program (Keewatin Career Development Corporation 2005). The KCDC 
proposed that it build on its existing expertise with video conferencing, ac-
quired through its work as a First Nations SchoolNet RMO, to create a skills 
development and training organization. The organization would rely heavily 
on video conferencing and thus be available to any public or private sector 
group throughout northern Alberta and northern Saskatchewan, with a par-
ticular emphasis on small and medium-sized companies located in smaller 
communities. The application reviewed the KCDC’s past accomplishments, 
presenting them as a logical sequence of development reaching back from the 
current BRAND, SuperNet, and CommunityNet broadband projects, to the 
teacher skills training and use of video conferencing it employed in its role as 
First Nations SchoolNet RMO, to the multi-level skills training that was part 
of the Headwaters Smart Communities project, and ultimately to the KCDC’s 
very first project involving Internet-based skills training and support for em-
ployment counsellors in the North. Viewing its activities retrospectively, the 
KCDC was able to forge links between its earlier projects and the areas of exper-
tise that would be required for participation in the Workplace Skills Initiative.
In so doing, the KCDC engaged in a certain sleight-of-hand. The WSI pro-
gram had obviously not yet been developed when, for example, the Headwaters 
project was conceived. Although Headwaters did include a definite skills train-
ing and development component, the project was aimed primarily at novice 
ICT users, who were not the target audience of the Workplace Skills Initiative. 
The KCDC’s strategy, however, was to position itself in the grant competition as 
an organization that could already claim considerable experience and success 
in the area of skills training and development. Even though its application for 
a Workplace Skills Initiative grant was ultimately unsuccessful, the KCDC’s 
skill in presenting itself as an organization that could be entrusted with an-
other large project was another instance of reverse English, one that allowed 
the KCDC to continue as a player in the game.
One factor in the KCDC’s success in assuming a leadership role in the 
community was its experience with the Northern Labour Market Commit-
tee (NLMC). The NLMC, established in 1983, is made up of over eighty different 
government and private sector agencies in northern Saskatchewan, including 
Aboriginal organizations and industry-based groups, that are broadly involved 
with skills training, funding opportunities, and economic development. It 
meets quarterly and is a clearing house for anything of interest relating to em-
ployment and the economy. The KCDC was a member of the NLMC while the 
Headwaters project was underway and has maintained observer status since 
then. Through its participation in the NLMC, the KCDC was able to establish 
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a reputation in the community as an organization noted for its technological 
expertise. As the senior KCDC staff member who was involved with the NBN 
application observed:
Because of the Smart Communities program and the way we structured our 
matching funds, there was strong participation from both the school divisions 
and the municipalities for in-kind contributions. So they were very aware of 
what we had been doing already with Smart Communities at that point. We 
had been having some successes and making things happen, so we were def-
initely seen as the technological leadership group in northern Saskatchewan.
Finally, the KCDC’s overarching policy objective has been to draw jobs to 
northern Saskatchewan, in particular, and, more generally, to keep people and 
jobs in the North. This goal is evident, for example, in the comment made by 
the KCDC telecommunications expert about the need for good mathematics 
and science training so that Northern residents will be qualified for skilled 
positions in the mining industry. The KCDC aimed to achieve this object-
ive through its involvement with programs, such as BRAND, First Nations 
SchoolNet, and Breaking Barriers, that focused on connectivity. Participa-
tion in these programs was one way to keep the goals of employment and an 
improved quality of life in the North in play.
One continuing risk, however, is that by engaging in initiatives that em-
phasize broadband connections and video conferencing in support of job 
training, the KCDC is helping Northerners acquire skills that might ultim-
ately encourage them to leave the region.
The NBN project actually did result in more jobs for residents of north-
ern Saskatchewan, while simultaneously producing an increased revenue 
stream for the KCDC. SaskTel did not have much of a staff presence in north-
ern Saskatchewan at the time, nor were there local companies who could do 
the required work of installation. The KCDC seized on the opportunity and 
was able to fill the gap with graduates of its youth IT trainee program, who 
carried out the final installation in local communities. As the KCDC telecom-
munications expert noted, during the implementation of the NBN project, the 
KCDC stood in a double relationship with SaskTel:
So KCDC became in effect a SaskTel vendor, much the same as any big city 
[service retailer such as] Wireless Age. All of these different companies, if 
you go to them, they have “High Speed Dealer” in their window. Well, KCDC 
became a SaskTel High Speed Dealer for Northern communities. That put us 
in a business relationship with SaskTel, so we were in a slightly odd position, 
I suppose. On one hand we were the proponent, and on the other hand we 
were a subcontractor of the main vendor.
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Although the KCDC was able to capitalize on this dual relationship, the NBN 
project was of limited duration, and a concern with the creation of skilled 
jobs remains one of the KCDC’s priorities.
C o n C l u s i o n
Three more observations can be made about the KCDC and its role in north-
ern Saskatchewan. The first is that things change. The individuals associated 
with the NBN application and the subsequent installation of broadband ser-
vices had a track record with each other that facilitated the project. But many 
of these people have now moved on, and new relationships have to be built. 
The funding environment has also changed. The KCDC senior manager noted 
that the organization now has “more of a straight business relationship” with 
one of the Saskatchewan tribal councils, “as opposed to a community develop-
ment partnership.” As he went on to explain:
That’s partly because that’s the way that KCDC is evolving. Now our partners 
are business partners. . . . It’s because the government programs have dried up, 
and we don’t have any core funding at all. So we have to, in order to survive, 
go in the direction of providing commercial services in more of a business 
arrangement as opposed to program proposals. . . . It really changes the na-
ture of your organization. It really takes you out of community development.
Second, in the environment of the development of broadband telecommuni-
cations in northern Saskatchewan and the BRAND program, there were, to 
paraphrase the Saskatchewan-based Industry Canada policy analyst, no 
secrets. With regard to SaskTel, he remarked: “You know, there are a lot 
of well-known secrets about SaskTel’s infrastructure, what’s already in the 
ground, and what was being put up . . . and [about] how aggressive they are 
in protecting their own territory, too.” But the notion of “well-known secrets” 
applies more broadly. Whatever their formal organizational affiliation, the in-
dividuals involved in the BRAND proposals had worked with one another for 
many years. There was considerable back-and-forth as the proposals were be-
ing developed. Industry Canada provided feedback on the proposals as they 
evolved. SaskTel was actively involved not only as a respondent to the RFP but 
also in the ongoing development and evaluation of the two rounds of propos-
als. The KCDC talked with other applicants across Canada. The same is true 
of other government programs in which the KCDC has participated. Personal 
relationships had formed over time. There was confidence that the various 
parties could deliver on their commitments and obligations. In rural and 
remote areas, people often wear a lot of hats. Everyone knows what is going 
on. Although it is possible to distinguish specific discourses and analyze the 
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relationships among the various actors, the fact remains that everyone knew 
everyone else’s business and conducted themselves accordingly.
The third observation concerns the question of what affordable and equit-
able telecommunications might mean in rural and remote areas. In contrast 
to urban dwellers, residents of rural and remote areas typically do not have 
many choices when it comes to health services and education. They must rely 
on broadband connections for access to telehealth and on multicast video con-
ferencing for advanced education and skills training. It is possible to argue 
that the goal of equity requires that rural and remote residents be provided 
with better telecommunications capacity and services than urban Canadians 
because they are so reliant on those services. Should this argument prevail, 
it makes the challenge of addressing market failure in these regions an even 
more pressing issue than it is currently assumed to be.
As a community-based organization located in a remote area of Canada, 
the KCDC has successfully faced numerous challenges, taken advantage of the 
opportunities available to it, and worked hard to create other opportunities. 
An initial examination of key texts has demonstrated that the KCDC was able 
to manoeuvre among competing discourses in order better to fulfill its mis-
sion of “bringing technology to the north.” Closer examination of texts, as 
well as a dialogic analysis of the interaction of these texts with various social 
contexts, is necessary, however, to fully describe the KCDC’s role in exploiting 
those discourses. It is my hope that the research described in this chapter will 
contribute to the skills that CBOs such as the KCDC routinely employ not only 
to ensure their continued survival but also to further their ability to serve 
their communities. I also hope that this research will contribute to the de-
velopment of a knowledge-based public policy.
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Note s
 1 The NBTF report estimated the maximum cost of connecting all communities, homes, 
and businesses at $4.6 billion. In June 2001, David Johnston, the NBTF chair, clarified 
that the task force had proposed a two-phase process. The first phase, which would 
cost between $1.85 billion and $2.5 billion, would connect all communities by 2004. 
This cost would be shared by all levels of government and the private sector. The 
second phase, costing approximately $2 billion, would extend broadband connec-
tivity to homes and businesses and would be funded primarily by the private sector 
(Johnston 2001). Minister of Industry Brian Tobin gained cabinet support for $1 bil-
lion in funding, but when the budget was presented in December 2001, the amount 
had been reduced to $35 million over a three-year period from 2004 to 2006 (Scof-
field 2001). This provoked a very public dispute between Tobin and Prime Minister 
Paul Martin that culminated in Tobin’s high-profile resignation from the cabinet.
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 2 For more information, see “Broadband Canada: Connecting Rural Canadians,” http://
www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/719.nsf/eng/home, and, in particular, the “Frequently Asked 
Questions” section (http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/719.nsf/eng/h_00004.html#BPQ1).
 3 Community-based organization is one of several terms used to describe organizations 
that are involved with the delivery of services and programs—typically, although 
not exclusively programs sponsored by governments—to individuals and groups in 
a community. Other terms include the not-for-profit sector, the voluntary sector, the 
third or independent sector, and the non-government sector.
 4 This and additional information about the region is available at http://www.fnmr.gov.
sk.ca/nad.
 5 The KCDC’s involvement with Alberta’s SuperNet and Saskatchewan’s CommunityNet, 
as the First Nations SchoolNet RMO responsible for both provinces, provided it with 
an insider’s view of both initiatives at all stages, from public discussion, the formula-
tion of program objectives, and systems design and delivery through to operational 
realities.
 6 For a critical examination of this rather narrow interpretation, see Stevenson 2009.
 7 Examining the impact of PowerPoint on organizational communication, Yates and Or-
likowksi (2007) argue that PowerPoint presentations are coherent texts with specific 
characteristics that can be identified and tracked. The tendency for PowerPoint to 
encourage a somewhat simplistic and reductive form of thinking has also been noted 
(see, e.g., Parker 2001). In addition, everyday experience with presentations made by 
civil servants suggests that the “deck” is a carefully prepared script and that speakers 
rarely depart from or embellish the text accompanying the slides.
 8 These statistics appeared in the December 2008 CommunityNet FAQ. CommunityNet 
remains a major priority of the provincial government, as was indicated by a grant to 
SaskTel in 2008 of $90 million (later quietly reduced to $45 million). This grant pro-
vided partial funding for a $129 million SaskTel project to extend CommunityNet to 
even more communities, to upgrade existing facilities, and to add additional cellphone 
towers to support wireless broadband access. The next objective of the program is to 
bring high-speed broadband to farm gate and to communities that are exceedingly 
remote.
 9 “This government” is that of Brad Wall and the Saskatchewan Party, which came to 
power in 2007. The previous government was that of the NDP, which governed Sas-
katchewan from 1991 to 2007, with Roy Romanow and then Lorne Calvert as premier. 
Gary Lane was the minister responsible for telecommunications during the adminis-
tration of Grant Devine and the Conservative Party (1982 to 1991).
 10 Primary texts include, at the national level, Assembly of First Nations 2001b, 2004, 
and 2008, and, at the provincial, B.C. First Nations Technology Council 2005. I also 
examined documents from other Aboriginal organizations: Meadow Lake Tribal 
Council 2002; Northern Broadband Network 2003, 2007; K-Net 2004; Keewaytinook 
Okimakanak 2005. Also useful were consultation documents and reports of meet-
ings that represent significant Aboriginal participation (Jock et al. 2004; Aboriginal 
Voice 2005; Nickerson and Kaufman 2005) and published academic research (Alex-
ander 2001; Matiation 1999; Pannekoek 2001; J. Whiteduck 2010; T. Whiteduck 2010), 
as well as and briefs and submissions, such as a RICTA 2005.
 11 Included among the numerous KCDC documents I examined were “Headwaters 
Project: Vision of the Future” (1999); “Headwaters Project Business Plan” (2000); 
“Headwaters Project 2004: Online Report” (2004); “Saskatchewan and Alberta 
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e-Communities: Rural, Remote and Aboriginal, Three-year Plan, 2006–2009” (2005); 
“Northern Innovation” (2005); “Workplace Skills Initiative: Submission to Human Re-
source and Skills Development Canada” (2005); and “Decreasing Rural Poverty Through 
Application of Information and Communication Technology (ICT): Presentation to 
the Senate Standing Committee on Agriculture and Forestry—Rural Poverty Hear-
ing” (2007). In addition, between 2002 and 2005, I looked at various announcements 
in the News and Events section of the KCDC home page.
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